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WHY THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH
SHOULD NOT BE USED WHEN
DETERMINING WHETHER AN OFFENSE IS
A CRIME OF VIOLENCE UNDER THE
RESIDUAL CLAUSE OF 18 U.S.C. § 924(C)
MARY FRANCES RICHARDSON*
Courts often use a controversial tool called the “categorical approach” to
determine whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a “violent felony”
or a “crime of violence.” Many federal criminal statutes require the use of the
categorical approach because they provide for increased penalties if a defendant
has prior convictions for violent crimes. For example, under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), a defendant who commits a firearms
offense and also has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug
offenses faces a minimum mandatory sentence and a higher maximum possible
sentence than would have been the case had she simply committed the firearms
offense without the prior convictions. Because of the significant effect that a
conviction for a violent crime can have, the determination of whether an offense
falls within the definition of “violent crime” is vital. The Supreme Court has
made clear that it is the judge, using the so-called “categorical approach,” who
determines whether a prior conviction was for a violent felony under the ACCA,
or a crime of violence under statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 16. The categorical
approach requires a court to consider the statutory definition of the crime at
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issue, rather than the actual facts that gave rise to the conviction, to determine
whether the prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA.
In its recent decision in Johnson v. United States, however, the Court
determined that the use of the categorical approach rendered part of the
definition of violent felony—the “residual clause”—unconstitutionally vague.
Similarly, in Sessions v. Dimaya, the Court decided that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is
unconstitutionally void for vagueness under Johnson. However, the Court has
not considered whether the categorical approach must be used in determining if
an offense is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Section 924(c)
provides for a mandatory consecutive sentence for a defendant who uses or
carries a firearm during and in relation to a federal crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, or who possesses a firearm in furtherance of such a crime.
Section 924(c) thus creates a separate crime that applies in the context of the
facts at issue in the case before the court rather than to prior convictions.
The § 924(c) definition of crime of violence is identical to the definition of
crime of violence set forth in § 16. Lower courts are divided as to who should
determine whether an offense is a crime of violence under the residual clause of
the § 924(c) definition. Some district courts employ the categorical approach,
while others suggest that a jury can decide whether the offense satisfies the
residual clause of the crime of violence definition. Because the statute does not
apply to a prior conviction but instead applies to a particular set of real-world
facts that a jury can use to decide whether an offense meets the statute’s
definition of crime of violence, courts should not employ the categorical approach
when determining whether an offense is a crime of violence under the § 924(c)
residual clause. Additionally, because § 924(c) applies in the context of facts
that a jury can consider during deliberation, the factors that require use of the
categorical approach for prior convictions are inapplicable, thus escaping
constitutional issues that are implicated under the ACCA and § 16.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the Supreme Court held the so-called “residual clause” of
the definition of “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),1 to be unconstitutionally vague.2 The

1. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
2. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555–57 (2015) (explaining that
the “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) allows for the statute’s definition of
“violent felony” to include “any felony that involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another”). The Ninth Circuit has alternatively called
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decision thereby reduced the class of prior convictions that can subject
defendants convicted of a federal firearms offense to a mandatory
minimum sentence.3 In 2018, the Court voided similar language in the
general federal definition of “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. § 16, which
subsequently reduced the class of prior convictions that can subject a
non-citizen to deportation.4 The language of § 16 is virtually identical
to the definition of crime of violence that applies to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)5—a statute that makes it a separate criminal offense to use or
carry a firearm while committing a federal crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime. However, as argued below, although the Court
determined that the residual clause of § 16 is unconstitutional, the
identical provision of § 924(c) should survive because a jury, rather
than a judge, can decide whether a crime constitutes a crime of violence.6
As noted, § 924(c) criminalizes the use or possession of a firearm
while committing a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime.7 For
example, in United States v. Prickett,8 the defendant shot his wife
multiple times with a firearm while camping.9 He conditionally pled
guilty to assault with intent to commit murder10 and a § 924(c)
violation and then sought to dismiss the § 924(c) count, but the district
court denied his motion.11 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, employing
the ACCA’s residual clause a “catchall” or “other-wise” clause to describe the effects of
the clause. See United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 960 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining
the various judicially constructed names describing the residual clause).
3. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (holding that the residual clause failed to give fair
notice to defendants of which crimes would be covered and invited “arbitrary
enforcement by judges”).
4. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018).
5. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (including within the definition of crime of violence,
“any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense”), with § 924(c)(3)(B) (including in the definition of a crime of
violence, “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense”).
6. Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1122 (9th Cir. 2015) (Callahan, J., dissenting)
(citing Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013)) (arguing that one of
the key elements of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Descamps was that the “elementcentric” method utilized in categorical approach cases was based on the grounds that
it “avoid[ed] Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing courts
making findings of fact that properly belong to juries”), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
7. See infra Section I.A. (explaining the purpose and background of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
8. 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
9. Id. at 698.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1) (criminalizing such acts).
11. Prickett, 839 F.3d at 698.
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the categorical approach in deciding that an assault with intent to
commit murder qualifies as a crime of violence.12
Courts often use this controversial tool called the “categorical
approach” to determine whether a defendant’s prior conviction
qualifies as a violent felony or a crime of violence.13 Many federal
criminal statutes provide for increased penalties if a defendant has
prior convictions for violent crimes.14 For example, under the ACCA,
a defendant who commits a firearms offense and also has three prior
convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses faces a
minimum mandatory sentence and a higher maximum possible
sentence than a defendant who commits the same firearms offense
with no prior convictions.15
The Supreme Court has made it clear that judges using the
categorical approach should determine whether a prior conviction was
for a violent felony under the ACCA,16 or a crime of violence under
statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 16.17 The categorical approach, which has
12. Id. (explaining that Johnson determined that one of the significant issues with
the “residual clause” of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) was that it allowed for arbitrary application
by judges); see also Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013) (identifying
that one element the court considered when examining a statute was whether it
“avoid[ed] Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing courts
making findings of fact that properly belong to juries”); infra Section I.B (explaining
the Supreme Court’s “categorical approach” in which the Court examines whether the
crime of conviction would fit the definition of violent felony as opposed to determining
whether the facts specific to an individual case would satisfy such a definition).
13. See infra Section I.B (discussing the background of the categorical approach).
14. See infra note 15; infra note 35 (imposing a scale of increasing sentences for
repeat offenders under § 924(c)).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (providing that a defendant convicted of possessing a
firearm or ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and who has three or more previous
convictions for a “serious drug offense,” a “violent felony,” or some combination of the
two, faces a minimum mandatory sentence of fifteen years and a maximum possible
life sentence, instead of a maximum sentence of ten years); see Welch v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261 (2016) (noting that § 924(e), which does not specify a maximum
penalty, carries a maximum possible sentence of life, and establishes a floor of fifteen
years minimum in prison and a ceiling of life in prison).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (defining a “violent felony” as a crime that has
as an element of use, attempted use, or threatened use of violence against a person or
property); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990).
17. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2018) (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft,
543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004)); 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining a crime of violence as an offense with
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, or that is a felony that by its nature involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in committing
the offense).
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its origins in Taylor v. United States,18 requires a court to consider the
statutory definition of the crime at issue, rather than the actual facts
that gave rise to the conviction, to determine whether it qualifies as a
violent felony under the ACCA.19
In its recent decision in Johnson v. United States,20 however, the Court
determined that the use of the categorical approach rendered part of the
definition of violent felony—the “residual clause”21—unconstitutionally
vague.22 Similarly, in Sessions v. Dimaya,23 the Court decided that 18
U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally void for vagueness under Johnson.24
The decision in Dimaya followed the precedent set in Leocal v. Ashcroft,25
in which the Court determined that lower courts must use the categorical
approach to determine whether a person has a prior conviction for a
crime of violence under § 16, and therefore has been convicted of an
aggravated felony that renders her subject to deportation.26
However, the Court has not considered whether the categorical
approach must be used to determine whether an offense is a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).27 Section 924(c) provides for a
18. 495 U.S. at 600–02.
19. See id. at 588 (contending that due to the particularly violent nature of burglary
and robbery, Congress chose to statutorily define the burglary and robbery statutes
rather than “le[aving them] to the vagaries of state law”); see also infra Section I.B
(providing an in-depth analysis of the categorical approach).
20. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining “violent felony,” in part, as a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that “otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”); see also
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555–56 (referring to this part of the definition as the “residual clause”).
22. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (deeming the ACCA’s residual clause
unconstitutionally void for vagueness because it creates uncertainty about how to
estimate the risk posed by a crime and how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a
violent felony).
23. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
24. Id. at 1213 (citing Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)) (finding that the same
concerning features that led the court to find the residual clause at issue in Johnson to
apply equally to the residual clause in Dimaya).
25. 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (examining the definition of the term crime of violence
in the context of crimes that suggest a “category of violent, active crimes”).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
27. See infra Section II.A (explaining the definition of a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012) (defining a crime of violence as any other felony
“that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense”), with 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (defining a crime of violence as a felony “that by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another
may be used in the course of committing the offense”).
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mandatory consecutive sentence for a defendant who uses or carries a
firearm during and in relation to a federal crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime, or who possesses a firearm in furtherance of such a
crime.28 Section 924(c) thus creates a separate crime that applies in
the context of the facts at issue in the case before the court rather than to
prior convictions.29
The § 924(c) definition of crime of violence30 is almost identical to
the definition of crime of violence set forth in § 16.31 Lower courts are
divided as to who should determine whether an offense is a crime of
violence under the residual clause of the § 924(c) definition.32 Some
district courts employ the categorical approach, while others allow the
jury to decide whether the offense satisfies the residual clause of the
crime of violence definition.33
This Comment argues that courts should not employ the categorical
approach when determining whether an offense is a crime of violence
under the § 924(c) residual clause because the statute does not apply
to a prior conviction but instead applies to a particular set of real-world
facts that a jury can use to decide whether an offense meets the
statute’s definition of a crime of violence.34
Part I of this Comment discusses the categorical approach and the
history that has led some courts to apply the categorical approach to
§ 924(c) and other courts to reject it. Part II argues that because
§ 924(c) applies in the context of particular facts that a jury can consider
during deliberation, the factors that require use of the categorical approach
for prior convictions are inapplicable. Part II also explains how § 924(c)
escapes constitutional issues that are implicated under the ACCA and § 16,
and recommends jury instructions as to what constitutes a crime of
violence under § 924(c). This Comment concludes that courts should
not employ the categorical approach when determining whether an
offense is a crime of violence under the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

28. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
29. See infra Section I.A (examining § 924(c) in-depth).
30. § 924(c)(3).
31. Id. § 16.
32. See infra Section I.B (describing the relationship between § 924(c) and the categorical
approach).
33. See infra Section I.B.
34. See infra Section II.A (contrasting § 924(c) with statutes that require the
categorical approach to show why the categorical approach is not necessary when
determining whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 924(c)).
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BACKGROUND

To offer a comprehensive understanding, Part I.A of this Comment
will first discuss components of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and its legislative
history. Parts I.B.1–3 provide an in-depth explanation of the categorical
approach, including when and why courts created the categorical
approach, the cases that shaped this approach, and the constitutionality
of the categorical approach. Lastly, Parts I.B.4–6 explore why many courts
currently employ the categorical approach when determining whether an
offense constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c).
A. Section 924(c)
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted
in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition
to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not
less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the firearm
is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 10 years.35

Congress enacted this statute to keep criminals from owning guns.36
Defendants can violate § 924(c) in the course of committing both violent
crimes and drug trafficking crimes.37 If a defendant violates § 924(c) in
the course of committing a violent or drug trafficking crime, then she is
subject to the mandatory minimum sentences provided for in the statute.38
Because determining whether the concurrent offense is a crime of
violence or a drug trafficking crime is vital in determining whether a
defendant has committed a § 924(c) offense, the statute defines both
terms.39 The § 924(c) definition of a “drug trafficking” crime is not relevant
to this Comment, but the definition of “crime of violence” reads as follows:

35. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
36. 114 CONG. REC. 22,231 (1968) (providing that Representative Poff’s floor
amendment proposal “targets upon the criminal rather than the gun” and created a
“separate Federal crime” for the possession of a gun during the commission of another
felony).
37. § 924(c).
38. Id.
39. § 924(c)(2) (defining “drug trafficking crime”); § 924(c)(3) (defining “crime
of violence”).
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(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term “crime of violence”
means an offense that is a felony and—(A) has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person or property of another, or (B) that by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.40

This definition includes both an elements clause41 and a residual clause.42
Whether the offense at issue is a crime of violence is an element of the
crime, not a sentencing enhancement.43
The legislative history of § 924(c) reveals the piecemeal way in which
the statute took its current form.44 Over the past five decades, Congress
has amended § 924(c) several times.45 It was originally part of the Gun
Control Act of 1968,46 which Congress passed to prevent crime by
encouraging criminals to leave their guns at home.47 At this early stage,
Congress was eager to support mandatory sentencing because of a
40. § 924(c)(3).
41. § 924(c)(3)(A) (“a felony [that] . . . has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another”); see also
United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2016) (referring to
§ 924(c)(1)(A) as the “elements clause”). Some other courts have different shorthand
ways of referring to § 924(c)(3)(A), such as the Eleventh Circuit, which called it the
“risk-of force” clause in Ovalles v. United States, 861 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2017),
vacated, 890 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2018) (Mem.), and the Second Circuit, which called
it the “force clause” in United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 2018).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (“[A] felony . . . that by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense.”); see also United States v. Hernandez,
228 F. Supp. 3d 128, 133 (D. Me. 2017) (describing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) as the
“residual clause”). As with § 924(c)(3)(A), some other courts have a different
shorthand for referring to § 924(c)(3)(B), such as the Second Circuit, which calls it
the “risk-of-force” clause in Hill, 832 F.3d at 138.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, No. 15-20552, 2016 WL 2591874, at *5 (E.D. Mich. May
5, 2016) (asserting that because a crime of violence is an element of § 924(c) as opposed to a
sentencing factor, it must be “submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt”).
44. See United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1122 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing United
States v. Diaz, 592 F.3d 467, 473–74 (3d Cir. 2010)).
45. Wendy E. Biddle, Let’s Make a Deal. Liability for “Use of a Firearm” when Trading
Drugs for Guns Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 65, 68 (2003) (providing a
legislative history on the evolution of § 924(c)).
46. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1223 (1968);
see also United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1545 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that
this law was partly a response to the assassinations of, among others, Martin Luther
King Jr. and John F. Kennedy) (citing United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 774, 776
(S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
47. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (providing a floor amendment
proposed by Representative Poff).
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growth in drug-related crimes, which resulted in a general public
frustration with the judicial system.48
In 1984, Congress amended § 924(c) as part of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act.49 This amendment mandated a heightened sentence
if the defendant committed a crime of violence under § 924(c).50 After
Congress realized that courts were struggling to define what constituted a
crime of violence,51 Congress amended § 924(c) again in 1986.52 The
1986 amendments included the addition of the current residual clause to
the definition of crime of violence.53 The amendments also expanded
§ 924(c) to include drug trafficking crimes to “combat the ‘dangerous
combination’ of ‘drugs and guns.’”54
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 16 have definitions of violent felony
and crime of violence that include residual clauses similar to the residual
clause contained in the § 924(c) definition of crime of violence; in fact, the
§ 16 residual clause is virtually identical to the § 924(c) clause.55 In Johnson,
the Supreme Court deemed the residual clause of § 924(e)
unconstitutional; and in Dimaya, the Court adhered to Johnson to similarly
determine the residual clause of § 16 unconstitutional.56
However, the Court has yet to determine whether the § 924(c) residual
clause is constitutional. Prior to Dimaya, several courts of appeals—the
48. See Biddle, supra note 45, at 69–70 (examining the issues of drug-related crimes
and their social costs and analyzing the evolution of statutory construction used to
combat crimes of that type).
49. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat.
1837, 2138-39 (1984), amended by Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. 103-322, § 110102(c)(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 1998 (1994) (amending section
924(c)(1) to include “‘or semiautomatic assault weapon,’ after ‘short-barreled shotgun’”).
50. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 313 (1983).
51. Alan M. Gilbert, Defining “Use” of a Firearm, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 842,
844 (1997) (arguing that to be considered under § 924(c), the firearm at issue must
be actively employed in the underlying criminal act).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2012) (noting that the act’s amendments section was
amended in 1986 to include the provisions mentioned above).
53. Id. § 924(c)(3)(B).
54. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998) (quoting Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993)).
55. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (“a felony . . . that by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense”), with id. § 16(b) (“a felony . . . that by
its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property
of another may be used in the course of committing the offense”), and id.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”).
56. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018).
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District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Eshetu,57 the Eleventh Circuit
in Ovalles v. United States,58 the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Prickett,59
the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Taylor,60 and the Second Circuit in
United States v. Hill61—had upheld the § 924(c) residual clause as
constitutional. Only the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cardena62 had
held the § 924(c) residual clause void for vagueness under Johnson.63
The courts of appeals that upheld the § 924(c) residual clause prior to
Dimaya, however, did so by distinguishing the language of the § 924(c)
residual clause from the language of the ACCA residual clause, an
approach that is no longer tenable given that Dimaya extended Johnson to
the identical language of the § 16 residual clause. Indeed, since Dimaya,
the District of Colombia Circuit revisited its decision in Eshetu,
determining that the § 924(c) residual clause is void for vagueness.64
Although the § 924(c) crime of violence residual clause is similar to
the § 924(e) residual clause and materially identical to the § 16 residual
clause, the § 924(c) definition is functionally different because § 924(c)

57. See 863 F.3d 946, 954–55 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding that the § 924(c)
residual clause is not unconstitutionally vague because, unlike the ACCA residual
clause, it does not have a “‘confusing list’ of enumerative crimes,” requires a different
method of risk assessment from the ACCA, and includes the temporal limitation “risk
that physical force . . . may be used in the course of committing the offense” that the
ACCA does not), vacated in part, No. 15-3020, 2018 WL 3673907, *2 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3,
2018) (vacating Defendants’ § 924(c) convictions in light of Dimaya).
58. See 861 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2017) (refusing to hold that the residual
clause in § 924(c) is unconstitutionally void for vagueness), vacated, 890 F.3d 1259
(11th Cir. 2018) (Mem.).
59. See 839 F.3d 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (upholding § 924(c)(3)(B)
against a vagueness challenge because it is narrower than the ACCA residual clause).
60. See 814 F.3d 340, 379 (6th Cir. 2016) (using the differences between
§ 924(c)(3)(B) and the ACCA residual clause—for example, § 924(c)(3)(B) deals with
physical force rather than injury—to determine that § 924(c)(3)(B) is not
unconstitutionally void for vagueness).
61. See 832 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
2551 (2015)) (holding that § 924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness
because it “does not involve the double-layered uncertainty present in Johnson”).
62. See 842 F.3d 959, 996 (7th Cir. 2016) (deeming the § 924(c) residual clause
unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process because of its similarity to the
ACCA residual clause).
63. Id. (holding that the statute at issue was “virtually indistinguishable” from the
unconstitutionally vague clause in Johnson).
64. See United States v. Eshetu, No. 15-3020, 2018 WL 3673907, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
3, 2018) (concluding “that Dimaya dictates vacatur of . . . [S]ection 924(c) convictions”).
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applies to the real-world facts at issue in a pending case, while § 924(e)
and § 16(b) apply to prior convictions.65
B.

The Categorical Approach

The categorical approach is a fundamental tool courts use to determine
whether a prior conviction satisfies the definition of crime of violence or
violent felony.66 When a court uses the categorical approach, it examines
the statute of conviction rather than the underlying conduct of the
defendant.67 Under the categorical approach, a court assesses only the
elements of the statute at issue.68 A court may only determine that the prior
conviction falls under the relevant definition as a matter of law, and may
not use the facts of the prior conviction in making its determination.69
The categorical approach itself comprises a four-step process.70
First, a court identifies the definition at issue, such as violent felony in
the ACCA or crime of violence in § 16.71 Second, a court determines
the statute of the conviction, and, if the statute is divisible into separate
crimes, will use the modified categorical approach72 to identify which

65. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012), with § 924(e), and § 16.
66. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, BIA: Categorical Approach is CircuitSpecific, CRIMMIGRATION (Feb. 12, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2015/
02/12/bia-categorical-approach-is-circuit-specific.
67. See The “Categorical Approach,” “Modified Categorical Approach,” and How the Ninth
Circuit’s Young v. Holder Modifies the Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions,
BEAN + LLOYD LLP (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.beancard.com/blog/2012/09/thecategorical-approach-modified-categorical-approach-and-how-the-ninth-circuits-young-v
-holder-mod [hereinafter How Approaches Modify Immigration Consequences] (providing
the example that petty theft would not categorically be a crime of violence, even if the
defendant used force or violence to commit the theft, or escape prosecution if that
conduct did not lead to any convictions in criminal court).
68. See David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The Residual Clause of
the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 CONN. L. REV. 209, 213–14 (2010) (reconciling the
difference between a strict categorical approach where the applicability of a clause
would be based solely off the category of crime at hand, and the limiting case law
surrounding the residual clause which limits its applicability to cases where the crimes
“typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct”).
69. Id. at 213.
70. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Categorical Approach: 2016 Annual National
Seminar (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national
-training-seminar/2016/backgrounder_categorical-approach.pdf.
71. Id.
72. Courts use the modified categorical approach when a defendant’s prior conviction
is for violating a “divisible statute,” that is, a statute that sets out one or more crimes in the
alternative. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). For example, if one set of
elements in a divisible statute defines a crime of violence under the ACCA, but the other
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crime is currently at issue.73 Third, a court identifies the elements of
the statute of the conviction.74 Fourth and last, a court is the elements
of the statute of conviction to the definition at issue.75
The categorical approach is used in many contexts.76 For example,
in addition to using the categorical approach under the ACCA and
§ 16, a court uses it when defining prior sexual assault convictions that
give rise to higher minimum and maximum possible sentences.77 It
is also a vital tool in immigration law, where courts use it to determine
whether a prior conviction is a crime of violence and therefore an
“aggravated felony” that can have serious immigration consequences,

set of elements does not, courts are permitted under the modified categorical approach to
consult a limited set of documents to determine which form of the statute underlies the
conviction and therefore whether the conviction was for a violent felony. Id. at 2281. These
documents may include indictments and jury instructions. Id.
73. Id.; see also How Approaches Modify Immigration Consequences, supra note 67
(illustrating the difference between the categorical and modified categorical
approaches when dealing with instances where there are multiple, distinct methods of
violating a single statute, requiring courts to conduct closer analysis of the facts in a
case to determine whether the particular method constitutes a crime of violence).
74. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 70.
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 62–67.
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (2012) (“[B]ut if such person has a prior conviction
under this chapter . . . such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for
not less than 15 years nor more than 40 years”); see also United States v. Geasland, 694
F. App’x 422, 434 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that because courts must use the categorical
approach when determining whether a defendant’s prior conviction is an offense set forth in
§ 2252(b)(2), what matters is not the underlying facts of the case, such as the age of the victim
or the type of abuse, but what the statute requires as proof, thus affirming the district court’s
decision to subject the defendant to a mandatory minimum of ten years imprisonment).
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such as deportation.78 Career offender79 and firearm80 sentencing
guidelines also require courts to use the categorical approach.81
Federal judges and administrative agencies have varying understandings
of the categorical approach, and lower courts are often divided over its
use, thus producing inconsistency.82 This inconsistency frustrates jurists
such as Justice Alito, who has stated that the categorical approach breeds
“strange and disruptive resul[ts].”83 According to Justice Alito, these
“strange and disruptive result[ts]” include the possibility that
defendants who engage in the same conduct may suffer disparate
collateral consequences in different states depending on how the state
defines its statutes of conviction.84 Some courts also disfavor the
categorical approach because the lack of clarity in the categorical and
modified categorical approach leads to many appeals.85 Courts in favor
of the categorical approach argue that this uncertainty is merely a

78. See 18 U.S.C. § 16; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012) (providing categories of
aggravated felonies for courts to consider when deciding deportation cases, as exemplified
by the Third Circuit’s analysis in Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2004)).
79. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4B1.1–.2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016) (defining a crime of violence as “any offense under federal or state law,
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that—(1) has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
of another”); see also United States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(looking at whether a conviction for a non-residential burglar is categorically a crime of
violence under § 4B.1, otherwise known as the Career Offender Sentencing Guidelines).
80. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2015) (increasing the maximum punishment if a “defendant committed . . . two felony
convictions of either a crime of violence . . . or . . . if the defendant committed any part
of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either
a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense”); see also United States v.
Edwards, 836 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2016) (vacating the district court’s decision
because the defendant’s burglary convictions could not serve as predicate offenses for
sentencing under § 2K2.1, and therefore could not employ the categorical approach).
81. See supra notes 79–80 (examining federal sentencing guidelines and related
case law requiring that a categorical approach be taken when examining the
underlying statutory sections at issue).
82. See Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach
to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 261 (2012).
83. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 n.11 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
84. Id.; see also United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (per curiam) (emphasizing that the categorical approach has created
confusion among courts).
85. See Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 917 (citing nine cases from the Ninth
Circuit, which explain the categorical approach).
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natural result of the method, and whatever disparity it may create is the
same as between two defendants whose real-world conduct was identical.86
1. The genesis of the categorical approach
The categorical approach has its genesis in Taylor v. United States,
which provides that courts may only look at the fact of the prior
conviction’s existence and what the statutory definition of that prior
conviction in determining whether the conviction qualifies as a violent
felony under the ACCA.87 The defendant in Taylor pled guilty to one
felony count of possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1).88 At the time he pled guilty, the defendant had four prior
convictions: one for robbery, one for assault, and two for seconddegree burglary under Missouri law.89 The ACCA provides for a
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years as opposed to a
maximum sentence of ten years for a defendant convicted under
§ 922(g) who has at least three prior convictions for violent felonies,
including convictions for burglary.90 Taylor conceded that his robbery
and assault convictions qualified as violent felonies, but contended
that the burglary convictions did not.91 The district court disagreed
and sentenced the defendant to fifteen years.92 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed, ruling that the word burglary in the ACCA definition of
violent felony “means ‘burglary’ however a state chooses to define it.”93
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eighth Circuit’s decision.94
In so doing, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s view that the term
“burglary” depended on the definition of that term in the state of
conviction, finding it implausible that Congress intended for courts to
treat identical conduct differently depending on how a particular state
defined that crime.95 The Court also determined that Congress did
not intend for courts use the common law definition of burglary in
determining whether a conviction qualified as a violent felony, but
86. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 591 (1990) (recognizing that different
juries can consider an identical set of facts and reach different conclusions).
87. Id. at 600 (basing its holding on the premise that including the facts or
circumstances of the conviction could be too prejudicial).
88. Id. at 578.
89. Id.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012); § 924(e).
91. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 579 (1990).
92. Id. at 579.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 602.
95. Id. at 590–91.

2004

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1673

instead intended that courts utilize the broader “generic” definition of
burglary found in the Model Penal Code.96
The Court then turned to the issue of how a court should determine
whether a particular conviction was for “generic burglary.”97
Specifically, the Court considered whether a sentencing court should
look only to the statutory definition of the prior offenses, or if it instead
could also look at the facts underlying the convictions to determine
whether the defendant’s conduct qualified as a violent felony.98
In determining that courts should use the categorical approach, the
Court relied on three considerations.99 First, the Court found that the
language of the ACCA definition applies to a person who has certain
previous convictions rather than a person who committed certain
crimes.100 This language suggests that Congress intended courts to
look at the elements of the crimes rather than at the facts underlying
the convictions.101 Second, nothing in the legislative history indicated
that Congress intended different results for convictions for the same
offense depending on a defendant’s actual conduct.102 And third, the
Court observed that the practical difficulties in using a factual
approach would be “daunting,” noting that sentencing courts would
have difficulty determining the factual bases for prior convictions.103
Additionally, a sentencing court’s determination that a defendant had
committed a prior crime in such a way as to constitute a violent felony
might abridge the defendant’s right to a jury trial.104 The Court thus
concluded that the only reasonable interpretation of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)
is that a court must consider only that a prior conviction exists and the
statutory definition of the crime of conviction.105

96. Id. at 594–95; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2017)
(providing the common law definition of “burglary,” which is “enter[ing] a building
or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose
to commit a crime therein”).
97. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 600–01.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 601 (emphasizing that what matters is the conviction and not the facts
leading up to the conviction).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 601–02 (finding that when the facts are introduced at sentencing the
judge acts as a quasi-fact finder, which is a job reserved for a jury).
105. Id. at 602.
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2. The categorical approach avoids mini-trials
The Supreme Court in Taylor recognized the practical inconveniences
of a fact-based approach to determine whether a predicate offense
constitutes a crime of violence, and how the categorical approach
avoids these practical inconveniences.106 For example, under a factbased approach, if the government introduces trial transcript evidence
to prove its assertion that a defendant’s prior crime constitutes a
violent felony, the introduction of such evidence could be unfair and
strain a court’s time and resources.107 Therefore, courts opt to use the
categorical approach, which avoids the need for mini-trials to
determine the factual basis for a prior conviction.108
In United States v. Krawczak,109 in which the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit considered whether the lower court had correctly
applied a guidelines enhancement, the court acknowledged that the
guidelines commentary rejected the Taylor categorical approach.110
However, the court still opted to employ the categorical approach
because using mini-trials would most likely result in an “elaborate,
historical fact-finding process.”111 By applying the categorical approach
instead of holding mini-trials for each predicate offense, sentencing
courts avoid an “inconsistent and unreliable method” on which to base
enhanced sentences.112 Courts also use the categorical approach
instead of mini-trials for administrative efficiency because a fact-based,
mini-trial approach would involve evidentiary hearings that attempt to
recreate the factual basis for a prior conviction.113

106. Id. at 601.
107. Id. at 601–02 (holding that the most judicially efficient and just method is to
introduce the conviction and not the supporting documents).
108. See Rebecca Sharpless, Toward A True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical
Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 1032 (2008) (emphasizing
that courts consistently adopt the categorical approach to avoid mini-trials).
109. 331 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2003).
110. Id. at 1306.
111. See id. (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601–02, which discusses the impracticability of
mini-sentencing trials that include parties sifting through extensive transcripts).
112. See United States v. Spence, 661 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing United
States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 2002)).
113. See United States v. Faust, 853 F.3d 39, 64 (1st Cir. 2017) (determining the
categorical approach is both judicially efficient and constitutionally sound); United
States v. Nason, No. 00-CR-37-B-S, 2001 WL 123722, at *7 (D. Me. Feb. 13, 2001).
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The constitutional implications of the categorical approach
a. When it is constitutional to use the categorical approach

It is constitutional for a sentencing court to subject a defendant to
an increased minimum mandatory or maximum sentence based on
prior convictions, but only if the factual finding that the judge makes
is limited to the facts of the prior convictions themselves. Apprendi v.
New Jersey114 is a landmark case that provides the constitutional
underpinnings of the categorical approach. In Apprendi, the Court,
relying on Jones v. United States,115 held that any fact that increases the
maximum punishment a defendant faces (other than the fact of a prior
conviction) must go to a jury to decide, thus reversing the lower court’s
decision.116 Later, in United States v. Alleyne,117 the Court extended
Apprendi to facts that result in the imposition of mandatory minimum
sentences. The Court held that “any fact that . . . increases the [mandatory
minimum] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.”118
However, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,119 the Court confirmed
that it is constitutional for a sentencing court to find the fact of a prior
conviction to increase the maximum possible penalty that a defendant
faces.120 Almendarez-Torres specifically considered whether 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b)(2)121 merely enhances a sentence or instead creates a
separate crime with elements for a jury to consider.122 Section
1326(a),123 which defines the crime itself, forbids a deported alien from
114. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
115. See 526 U.S. 227, 252 (1999) (holding that in a trial in which a defendant was
convicted of carjacking and possessing a firearm, each element of each offense must
be determined beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury).
116. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
117. 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
118. Id. at 2155.
119. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
120. Id. at 246.
121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) (2012) (“Notwithstanding subsection (a), in the case
of any alien described in such subsection . . . (2) whose removal was subsequent to a
conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under
such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both . . . [f]or the purposes of this
subsection, the term ‘removal’ includes any agreement in which an alien stipulates to
removal during (or not during) a criminal trial under either Federal or State law.”).
122. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226.
123. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (“Subject to subsection (b), any alien who (1) has
been . . . deported . . . (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the
United States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United
States . . . the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien’s reapplying for
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returning to the United States unless she has special permission, and
provides for a maximum prison term of two years for any person who
returns unlawfully to the country in violation of the statute.124 If,
however, the defendant was deported after being convicted of an
“aggravated felony,” the maximum potential penalty increases to
twenty years.125 The defendant in Almendarez-Torres argued that
because an indictment must include each element of a crime, and
because his indictment did not mention his earlier aggravated felony
convictions, he could only face up to two years of imprisonment as
opposed to the eighty-five months the sentencing court imposed on
him.126 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, disagreed with this
argument because, while an indictment must state every element of the
current charge, an indictment does not need to state factors that are
only relevant to the offender’s possible sentence.127
Congress’s intent played a major role in the Court’s decision in
Almendarez-Torres.128 Specifically, the Court decided that it was
reasonably clear that Congress intended for § 1326(b)(2) to be a
sentencing factor,129 reasoning that the relevant statutory subject
matter is recidivism, and recidivism is a typical example of a sentencing
factor.130 Justice Breyer also pointed out that interpreting § 1326(b)(2)
to be a substantive criminal offense poses a risk of unfairness.131 The
Court concluded that § 1326(b)(2) is a sentencing factor and not an
element of a crime because recidivism is usually a sentencing factor

admission . . . shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or
both.”).
124. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 227 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)).
127. Id. at 228.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 230.
130. See id. (providing examples of other statutes dealing with recidivism that are
sentencing factors, such as U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016), which requires a sentencing judge to consider an
offender’s prior record in every case; 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2012), which instructs the
Commission to write Guidelines that increase sentences dramatically for serious
recidivists; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012), which imposes a significantly higher sentence
for a felon-in-possession violation by serious recidivists; and 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(1)(A)–(D) (2012), which operates similar to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) but for drug
distribution purposes).
131. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 235 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,
560 (1967)) (concluding that introducing evidence of predicate offenses to the jury
“is generally recognized to have potentiality for prejudice”).
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and introducing evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction could
greatly prejudice the jury.132 A decision that a defendant has a certain
prior conviction is the only fact that increases the maximum possible
sentence that a judge can make without violating Apprendi.133
b. Constitutional limitations of the categorical approach for
prior convictions
In Shepard v. United States,134 the Court clarified the constitutional
underpinnings of the categorical approach, emphasizing that judges
are not finders of fact. The origins of Shepard are briefly discussed in
Taylor, when the Court considered the practical difficulties and
potential unfairness of a practical, rather than categorical, approach.135
In Shepard, the petitioner pled guilty to violating § 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(g)(1).136 After the petitioner’s guilty plea, the government
argued that his sentence should be increased from the thirty-sevenmonth maximum guidelines sentence to the fifteen-year minimum
that the ACCA mandates for felons who have three prior violent felony
convictions.137 However, following Taylor,138 the district court found that
Shepard’s three prior convictions were not for “generic burglary” and
refused to follow the government’s request that it consider police reports
and complaint applications.139 The First Circuit vacated this decision and
ruled that courts should consider these sources when determining whether
a prior conviction was generic burglary, but on remand the district court
still refused to enhance the petitioner’s sentence.140
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
135. See id. at 24 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990)) (posing
several questions: Could the government submit the trial transcript or, if no transcript
existed, call witnesses? Could the defense call witnesses and suggest the jury might
have convicted on something other than generic burglary? “If the sentencing court
were to conclude, from its own review of the record, that the defendant actually
committed a generic burglary, could the defendant challenge this conclusion as
abridging his right to a jury trial?”).
136. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012)) (stating that it is unlawful for any
person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm).
137. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16.
138. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (allowing courts that are sentencing under the ACCA
to consider statutory elements, charging documents, and jury instructions when
deciding whether a prior conviction was for “generic burglary” or something else).
139. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17–18.
140. Id.
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Once Shepard reached the Supreme Court, the plurality agreed that
the evidence judges may look to under Taylor should not be extended
to include anything beyond what the categorical approach allows.141
The plurality acknowledged that the purpose of the decision in Taylor
was to establish the categorical approach, which allows courts to look
only at the fact that a prior conviction exists and the statutory
definition of that predicate offense.142 Applying this reasoning to
Shepard, the plurality agreed with the First Circuit that guilty pleas can
establish predicate offenses under the ACCA, but disagreed with the
government’s argument for a wider evidentiary scope.143
The Court concluded that allowing a sentencing judge to consider
evidence such as police reports and complaint applications would in
effect allow a sentencing judge to make a disputed finding of fact that
impacts the maximum sentence.144 Since the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee that a jury will determine any disputed fact
that might increase a defendant’s sentence, the plurality held that,
although the disputed fact in Shepard is a fact about a prior conviction,
a judge cannot resolve that dispute.145
4. The ACCA and the categorical approach
The ACCA definition of violent felony is similar to the § 924(c)
definition of crime of violence, which has caused some courts to
employ the categorical approach when determining whether an
offense is a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c). The definition
of violent felony for purposes of the ACCA reads as follows:
[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another . . . .146

141. See id. at 28 (Thomas, J., concurring) (determining that broadening the scope
of evidence judges may consider under Taylor would “give rise to constitutional error,
not constitutional doubt”).
142. See id. at 17 (majority opinion). But see Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (providing an
exception to the categorical approach for only “a narrow range of cases where a jury
was actually required to find all the elements of [a] generic [offense]”).
143. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 19.
144. Id. at 25.
145. Id. at 25–26.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).
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The legislative history of the ACCA’s enhancement provision
indicates that Congress was focused on career offenders.147 The
categorical approach appears always to have been inherent in the
statute. The 1984 statute defined violent felony in terms of “robbery”
and “burglary,” the definitions of which resembled state “robbery” and
“burglary” statutes.148 In 1986, Congress considered amending the
ACCA definition to re-define “robbery” or “burglary,” but instead
decided whether any property offenses should be considered predicate
offenses, and if any should, which ones.149 The House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary ultimately compromised to include some
property crimes, along with any crimes that “involve conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”150
The definition eventually took its current form, which has three
parts: (1) the portion of the definition that applies to a felony conviction
for a crime that “has [as] an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against a person,” commonly referred
to as the “elements clause”; (2) the portion of the statute that includes
convictions for the felony offense of burglary, arson, extortion, and
crimes that involve the use of explosives, commonly referred to as the
“enumerated offenses clause”; and (3) the portion of the definition
that applies to convictions for offenses that “otherwise involve conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,”
commonly referred to as the “residual clause.”151
The Supreme Court in Johnson held that imposing an increased
sentence under the ACCA’s residual clause violates due process.152 The
majority found the residual clause unconstitutionally vague for two
reasons.153 First, it created “grave uncertainty” about how to estimate
the risk posed by a crime because, under the categorical approach, a
147. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 587 (explaining that the focus on career offenders was due
to the fair number of criminals who commit serious crimes as their career, and because
that career involves the use of weapons, they pose a potential danger to others).
148. See United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 2016) (analyzing the
conduct necessary for a conviction of the predicate offense).
149. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 589.
150. H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 3 (1986).
151. Id.
152. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557, 2562 (2015) (citing Taylor,
495 U.S. at 589) (deciding that when determining whether an offense is a crime of
violence under the ACCA, courts must only look to the fact that the defendant has
previously been convicted of a crime that falls into a particular category instead of
looking at the facts underlying the prior conviction).
153. Id. at 2557.
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court has to assess risk based on “a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’
of a crime” rather than based on real-world facts or statutory
elements.154 Second, it created uncertainty as to how much risk it takes
for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.155 The Court observed that “[i]t
is one thing to apply an imprecise ‘serious potential risk’ standard to
real-world facts; it is quite another to apply it to a judge-imagined
abstraction.”156 The Court noted that inclusion of the enumerated
offenses—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of
explosives—actually contributed to the problem, as “[t]hese offenses
are ‘far from clear in respect to the degree of risk that each poses.’”157
The Court also noted that “this Court’s repeated attempts and
repeated failures to craft a principled and objective standard out of the
residual clause confirm its hopeless indeterminacy.”158
While determining that the ACCA residual clause “produces more
unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause
tolerates,”159 the majority made clear that the decision did not place
into constitutional doubt the dozens of state and federal crimes that
use risk-based language.160 To the contrary, the Court stated that “we
do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application
of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world
conduct.”161 The Court emphasized that the problem the categorical
approach posed was that it required courts to apply the residual clause
to an idealized generic case.162

154. Id.
155. Id. at 2558.
156. Id.
157. See id. (quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008)).
158. Id. An example of how courts construed the ACCA’s residual clause before it
was deemed unconstitutional in Johnson is found in James v. United States, 550 U.S.
192 (2007). In James, the Court held that attempted burglary was a crime of violence under
ACCA’s residual clause because if a homeowner, police officer, or other type of law
enforcement were to spot an armed, would-be burglar, then a chase might occur, which
could increase the risk of violence. Id. at 203. This reasoning conveys how the residual
clause leaves room for judges to apply their own impressions of a certain crime, as opposed
to real-world facts, to a statute, which leads to unconstitutional unpredictability.
159. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558.
160. Id. at 2561.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (2016) (citing
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) and Shepard v. United States, 544
U.S. 13, 25 (2005)) (clarifying that one of the reasons for applying the categorical
approach to the ACCA is to avoid a serious Sixth Amendment concern: except for the
simple fact of a prior conviction, “only a jury, and not a judge, can find facts that
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In Welch v. United States,163 the Supreme Court made clear that its
decision in Johnson arose because courts were required to use the
categorical approach under the ACCA residual clause.164 The district
court in Welch sentenced the defendant to fifteen years under the
ACCA, based in part on a conviction for a Florida “strong-arm
robbery.”165 The defendant contended that the offense was not a violent
felony under the ACCA.166 The district court disagreed and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, holding that the Florida statute qualified as a violent
felony under the ACCA residual clause.167
When Welch eventually made it to the Supreme Court, the Court’s
discussion of Johnson explained that the ACCA residual clause was
unconstitutionally void for vagueness because courts applied it under
the categorical approach, which required them to “assess the
hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version of the offense.”168
And, as it had done in Johnson, the Court in Welch emphasized that the
decision in Johnson does not cast doubt on the multitude of other laws
that also require the assessment of the riskiness posed by the
defendant’s conduct during the commission of an offense.169
5. Section 16(b) and the categorical approach
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the general federal definition
of crime of violence, to apply only to a limited scope of particularly
heinous offenses with elements that are met by significantly more than
the mere intent to commit violence.170 It reads as follows:
increase a maximum penalty,” so a judge at sentencing “cannot go beyond identifying
the [prior] crime of conviction to explore the manner in which the defendant
committed that offense”).
163. 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).
164. Id. at 1262.
165. Id.
166. Id. The relevant Florida statute against “strong-arm robbery” prohibits taking
property with the use of force, violence, or assault. The presentence report for Welch
stated that the defendant punched the victim and forcibly removed his jewelry. Id.
167. Id. at 1263 (revealing that the 11th Circuit did not rule on whether the
conviction at issue qualified as a violent felony under the elements clause, only that it
qualified under the residual clause).
168. See id. at 1262 (“The vagueness of the residual clause rests in large part on its
operation under the categorical approach.”).
169. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015)).
170. United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2003); see also
Mark Bradford, Deporting Nonviolent Violent Aliens: Misapplication of 18 U.S.C. § 16(B) to
Aliens Convicted of Driving Under the Influence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 901, 935 (2003) (citing
Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide (1993)) (pointing out that courts
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The term “crime of violence” means—
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.171

Section 16 has an elements clause172 and a residual clause173 that are
virtually identical to those in § 924(c). The legislative history of § 16
indicates that courts should employ the categorical approach when
determining whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 16,
rather than utilizing a fact-specific approach.174 Originally, Congress
included the phrase “crime of violence” in a 1970 District of Columbia
bail-reform law.175 Fourteen years later, Congress incorporated the term
into the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA), which is now
codified as 18 U.S.C. § 16.176 When Senator Strom Thurmond, the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on the 1984 Judiciary, authored the
Senate Report on the CCCA, he described the term “crime of violence”
as embracing the same categories of offenses found in the original
District of Columbia Code.177

have looked at the plain language § 16(b)’s inclusion of “use” to determine that the
specific intent is implied because “use” is defined as “employ,” “seek or achieve an end
by means of,” and “cause to act or serve for a purpose”).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012).
172. See id. § 16(a) (“[A]n offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another”).
173. Compare id. § 16(b) (“[T]hat, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.”), with id. § 924(c)(3)(B) (“[T]hat by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense.”).
174. See S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3483, 3486–87.
175. See District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 23-1331, 84 Stat. 473 (1970) (“The term ‘crime of violence’
means murder, forcible rape, carnal knowledge of a female under the age sixteen,
taking or attempting to take immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with a child
under the age of sixteen years, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, voluntary
manslaughter, extortion or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, arson,
assault with intent to commit any offense . . . or an attempt or conspiracy to commit
any of the foregoing offenses . . . if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year”).
176. S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3182.
177. Id. at 3201.
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The Supreme Court has considered Congress’s intent and the
constitutionality of § 16. On April 17, 2018, in Sessions v. Dimaya, the
Court held that the § 16 residual clause is void for vagueness under
Johnson.178 At issue in Dimaya was whether a lawful permanent resident
is removable because his California burglary conviction constituted a
crime of violence under the § 16 residual clause and is thus an
“aggravated felony” for purposes of immigration law.179 The Court
upheld the Ninth Circuit’s decision that the § 16 residual clause is
unconstitutionally vague.180
Specifically in Dimaya, the Court noted that, under the decision in
Leocal v. Ashcroft, a court determining whether an offense is a crime of
violence under § 16 must use the categorical approach.181 The Court
further observed that the opinion in Johnson recognized that two features
of the ACCA residual clause rendered it unconstitutional: (1) uncertainty
created by tying the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially-imagined
ordinary case of a crime rather than to real-world facts or elements; and (2)
uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent
felony.182 The Court held that the same combination of indeterminate
inquiries renders § 16(b)—the § 16 residual clause—unconstitutional.183
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the government’s
efforts to distinguish § 16(b) from the ACCA residual clause.184 The
government argued that “a less searching form of the void for vagueness
doctrine applie[d]” because § 16 is a civil, rather than criminal,

178. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223 (2018) (finding the residual clause
unconstitutionally vague because it requires judges to imagine an “ordinary case” in
the determination of a crime of violence).
179. See id. at 1210–11 (“The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) renders
deportable any alien convicted of an ‘aggravated felony,’” which “includes a crime of
violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18.”).
180. Id. at 1223.
181. See id. at 1211 (emphasizing that under § 16 a judge considers the nature of
the offense, generally speaking, as opposed to considering whether the “particular
facts” that underlie the conviction establish the § 16 definition of a substantial crime
or whether the statutes of the crime create a risk of violence).
182. Id. at 1213–14 (citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557–59
(2015)).
183. Id. at 1215 (pointing out that the government “explicitly acknowledges” that
§ 16(b) requires a court to identify a crime’s “ordinary case” to measure the risk of the
crime at hand).
184. Id. at 1212.
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matter.185 However, the Court noted that its own precedent established
that removal cases call for the most exacting vagueness standard
because deportation is a penalty that may be of greater concern than
“any potential jail sentence.”186
Having determined that the same void for vagueness standard
applies, the Court turned to whether the § 16 residual clause is
“materially clearer than its now-invalidated ACCA counterpart.”187 The
Court pronounced that “Johnson is a straightforward decision, with
equally straightforward application here.”188 The Court determined
that the same two features, which combined to render the ACCA clause
unconstitutional, exist with respect to § 16 and compel the same result:
(1) “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime”
because it “tie[s] the judicial assessment of risk” to a hypothetical,
judge-imagined “ordinary case” of a crime; and (2) uncertainty about
the level of risk that makes a crime “violent.”189
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the government’s
argument, as well as Chief Justice Roberts’s argument in the dissent,190
that there are three differences between the text of § 16(b) and the
ACCA residual clause. The government and Chief Justice Roberts
argued that these differences make the § 16(b) residual clause more
predictable and easier to apply than the ACCA residual clause.191
“These textual differences include how the § 16(b) use of the phrase
“in the course of” narrows the residual clause; how § 16(b) focuses on
“physical force” while the ACCA residual clause focuses on “physical
injury”; and how the § 16(b) residual clause is not preceded by a
“confusing list of exemplar crimes,” while the ACCA residual clause is
preceded by such a list.”192 The Court rejected the argument that these
distinctions make a meaningful difference.193 It found that the phrase
“in the course of” does little to narrow or focus the statutory inquiry
because a court must still assess the “ordinary case” of the crime in

185. Id. at 1212–13 (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498–99 (1982)) (arguing that a law that is too vague to support a sentence or a
conviction may be sufficient to support deportation).
186. Id. at 1213 (quoting Jae Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2017)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1213, 1215 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct 2551, 2557 (2015)).
190. Id. at 1236–38.
191. Id. at 1218.
192. Id. at 1218–21.
193. Id. at 1218.
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question.194 The Court also found that evaluating the phrase “physical
force” in § 16 requires a court to also evaluate “physical injury” and,
thus, “the force/injury distinction is unlikely to affect a court’s analysis
of whether a crime qualifies as violent.”195 Lastly, the Court held that
the absence of enumerated crimes in § 16 still leaves the two flaws that
render the § 16 residual clause unconstitutionally vague.196
In striking down the § 16 residual clause, the Court noted that the
phrase “substantial risk” is not inherently problematic.197 The Court,
following Johnson, emphasized that “‘we do not doubt’ the constitutionality
of applying § 16(b)’s ‘substantial risk [standard] to real-world conduct.’”198
6.

Section 924(c) and the categorical approach
a. The influence of § 924(e) and § 16 on courts’ decisions to employ the
categorical approach under § 924(c)

Since Johnson, defendants have argued that the Court’s holding
should be extended to cases involving other, similar definitions, and
that the categorical approach should be used in those cases as well.199
Many of these cases, such as Dimaya, involve immigration cases in which
courts use the § 16 crime of violence definition in deciding whether a
non-citizen has been convicted of a crime for which she should be
deported.200
194. Id. at 1221.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1215.
198. See id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
199. See In re Fields, 826 F.3d 785, 786–87 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (involving a
federal death row prisoner convicted of three counts under § 924(c) who argued that
the Johnson decision should apply to § 924(c), which the court ultimately rejected); see
also Gaton v. United States, No. 16-CV-3868, 2017 WL 4082310, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
13, 2017) (concerning a defendant who was allowed to amend his Complaint,
following a petition to withdraw a guilty plea to discharging a firearm in relation to a
crime of violence under § 924(c), arguing that his plea should be withdrawn because
the Johnson decision should extend to § 924(c)); Prado-Sanchez v. United States, No.
1:15-281-1, 2016 WL 6271894, at *3–4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2016) (recommending that
the court deny the defendant’s motion to vacate because the Johnson decision does not
extend to § 924(c) as the defendant asserts).
200. Kathryn Harrigan Christian, Comment, National Security and the Victims of
Immigration Law: Crimes of Violence After Leocal v. Ashcroft, 35 STETSON L. REV. 1001,
1018–19 (2006); see also Sharpless, supra note 108, at 993–94 (discussing whether there
is any bright-line rule addressing how judges should treat criminal convictions in
immigration law); and Erica Steinmiller-Perdomo, Note, Consequences Too Harsh for
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Section 924(c)201 is another statute to which defendants argue
Johnson’s holding should be extended, but it has created conflict in the
district courts. As this Comment noted previously,202 the § 924(c)
residual clause and overall definition of crime of violence is similar to
the ACCA’s definition of violent felony and is also almost identical to
the § 16 definition of crime of violence, which the Supreme Court held
in Leocal203 and confirmed in Dimaya,204 requires the use of the
categorical approach. Due to these similarities, many circuit courts
and defendants have agreed that courts must use the categorical
approach when construing the residual clause of § 924(c).205
The Seventh Circuit, in a pre-Dimaya decision, held that the § 924(c)
residual clause is unconstitutional because the Supreme Court held that
the § 924(e) residual clause is unconstitutional and some circuit courts
have held that the § 16 residual clause is unconstitutional.206 However,
unlike the § 16 residual clause, more circuit courts held, pre-Dimaya,
that the § 924(c) residual clause is constitutional.207 These courts did so
on the basis that the § 924(c) residual clause is constitutional because it

Noncitizens Convicted of Aggravated Felonies?, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1173, 1177–78 (2014)
(considering a narrower interpretation of “aggravated felony” under the Immigration
and Nationality Act).
201. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (2012) (providing a similar residual clause that
reads that a crime of violence means an offense that is a felony and “involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be
used in the course of committing the offense”).
202. See supra Section I.A.
203. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (considering whether an offense is
a crime of violence under § 16 and concluding that courts must “look to the elements
and nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts relating to
the petitioner’s crime”).
204. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1217–18 (2018).
205. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2246 (2016); Holder v. United
States, 836 F.3d 891, 892 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); United States v. Fuertes, 805
F.3d 485, 490 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132, 135–36 (2d Cir.
2006). But see United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2016).
206. See United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 996 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that
because the § 924(c) residual clause has identical language as the § 16 residual clause,
it is also unconstitutionally vague under United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 721
(7th Cir. 2015)).
207. See supra Section II.B. (listing the five circuits that have deemed the § 924(c)
residual clause not unconstitutionally void for vagueness, compared to only one circuit
court that has deemed § 924(c) unconstitutionally void for vagueness).
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is narrower than the ACCA’s residual clause.208 However, the Court in
Dimaya explicitly rejected this reasoning with respect to the identical
language of § 16.209
b. Inconsistent application of the categorical approach under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
Numerous courts employ the categorical approach when determining
whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 924(c), including a
number of circuit courts.210 The circuit courts that have done so are the
Second,211 Sixth,212 Seventh,213 Eighth,214 and Tenth215 Circuits. Before
Dimaya, the District of Columbia Circuit also employed the categorical
approach when determining whether an offense is a crime of violence,
but recognized that doing so is problematic.216 The Fourth Circuit

208. United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 394 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that a
number of distinctions between 924(c)(3) and ACCA’s residual clause remove
924(c)(3) from the scope of the opinion in Johnson).
209. See Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1219 (explaining that courts should not use
“imaginative” thinking when applying § 16, but instead must look at the ordinary case,
“which is all that matters under the statue”).
210. See, e.g., Holder, 836 F.3d at 892; Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 49; Acosta, 470 F.3d at 135;
United States v. Prayer, No. 8:04CR440, WL 318640, at *3 (D. Neb. Jan. 23, 2017);
United States v. Standberry, 139 F. Supp. 3d 734, 737 (E.D. Va. 2015).
211. See United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 2016) (using the categorical
approach to determine whether a Hobbs Act robbery categorically constitutes a crime
of violence under the § 924(c) residual clause).
212. See United States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437, 444 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing United
States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 497–99 (4th Cir. 2015)) (employing the categorical
approach to conclude that assaulting a federal law-enforcement officer is a crime of
violence); Evans v. Zych, 644 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Serafin,
562 F.3d 1105, 1107–08 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1086–
87 (9th Cir. 2006)).
213. See United States v. Armour, 840 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2016) (using the categorical
approach to determine that armed bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence).
214. See United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697, 698 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(stating that a court must examine the elements of the statute and apply the categorical
approach to § 924(c)(3)(B)).
215. See Serafin, 562 F.3d at 1107–08 (applying the categorical approach to find that
a § 5861(d) violation, which makes it unlawful for a person to engage in the business
of selling firearms without a special tax requirement, is not a crime of violence because
it does not invoke a disregard of the risk of force or foresee that force might be used
in the process of receiving or possessing the firearm).
216. See United States v. Eshetu, 863 F.3d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (analyzing the
§ 924(c) residual clause through what the court describes as being a “troublesome
categorical lens” and acknowledging that the § 924(c) residual clause “does not suffer
from quite the same amount of ‘unpredictability and arbitrariness’ as ACCA’s residual
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employs the categorical approach when determining whether an
offense is a crime of violence under § 924(c) as well.217 Some district
courts218 and appellate briefs219 also use, or advocate for the use of, the
categorical approach when arguing whether an offense is a crime of
violence under § 924(c).220
On the other hand, the Third Circuit,221 some appellate briefs,222 and
some district courts223 take the position that the categorical approach
is not necessary when determining whether an offense is a crime of
violence under § 924(c). The Third Circuit is distinct from the other
circuit courts in particular because it explicitly held in United States v.
Robinson224 that the categorical approach does not apply to § 924(c).225
In Robinson, the defendant brandished a firearm while committing a
Hobbs Act226 robbery, a fact that was found by the jury and that raised
clause”). Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Dimaya, the District of Columbia
Circuit has changed its stance on the § 924(c) residual clause and vacated the
sentences of the Defendants in Eshetu. See Eshetu, No. 15-3023, 2018 WL 3673907, *2
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2018).
217. Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 498.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Prayer, No. 8:04CR440, 2017 WL 318640, at *3 (D.
Neb. Jan. 23, 2017); United States v. Standberry, 139 F. Supp. 3d 734, 737 (E.D. Va. 2015).
219. Brief for Appellant at 11, United States v. Young (No. 16-1728), 2017 WL
2200841 (3d Cir. May 11, 2016); Brief of the Appellant at 10–11, United States v. Polhill
(No. 16-4419), 2016 WL 6871413 (4th Cir. Nov. 18, 2016); Appellant’s Opening Brief
at 13, United States v. Brazeal (No. 16-10325), 2016 WL 6820085 (9th Cir. Nov. 14,
2016); Brief for Appellee at 40, United States v. Evans (No. 16-4094), 2016 WL 4253926
(4th Cir. Aug. 8, 2016); Brief of Appellant at 25, United States v. Wilson (No. 16-4002),
2016 WL 691246 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 2016).
220. Standberry, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 737; Prayer, 2017 WL 318640, at *3. The Standberry
court reluctantly applied the categorical approach despite its concerns about the
method’s “one dimensional” review that does not examine the facts of the case, while
the court in Prayer seemed to favor the categorical approach precisely because it did
not require the sentencing court to re-try the facts of the case. Id.
221. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2016).
222. See Brief for Appellee at 46, 49, United States v. Campbell (No. 15-4281), 2016
WL 2619765 (4th Cir. May 5, 2016) (arguing that “[n]one of the purposes behind the
categorical approach apply to § 924(c)(3)(B)”).
223. See United States v. Wells, No. 2:14-cr-00280-JCM-GWF, 2015 WL 10352877, at
*3 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2015) (acknowledging that “several district courts have recently
stated that the categorical approach should not be used in deciding a pretrial motion
to dismiss charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)”).
224. 844 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2016).
225. Id. at 140.
226. The Hobbs Act prohibits the obstruction of commerce by threats of physical
violence, robbery, or extortion. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). A Hobbs Act robbery is “the
unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person . . . by means of
actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury.” Id.
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the mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(c) to seven years.227
The court held that when a § 924(c) brandishing case and a Hobbs Act
robbery are concurrent and “tried to the same jury,” the jury is
presented with all the facts necessary to determine whether the Hobbs
Act robbery was committed with the “use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of another” and
therefore satisfies the § 924(c) elements clause.228
While the Fifth Circuit has not addressed the issue of whether the
categorical approach should be applied to § 924(c), it recognizes that
§ 924(c) is a criminal offense that “requires the ultimate determination
of guilt . . . by a jury, in the same preceding.”229 The Eleventh Circuit
also has not fully addressed the issue of whether to apply the categorical
approach to § 924(c), but opines that the decision in Johnson might not
extend to § 924(c).230
Many district courts do not consider the categorical approach
necessary when determining whether an offense is a crime of violence
under § 924(c).231 The district court in United States v. Wells232 recognized
that several district courts have not applied the categorical approach to
pretrial motions to dismiss certain charges under § 924(c), pointing out
that the categorical approach is generally used when dealing with prior
convictions that might raise a defendant’s sentence.233 This is not the

227. Robinson, 844 F.3d at 141.
228. Id. at 144.
229. See United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670, 673 n.1 (5th Cir. 2016)
(asserting that Taylor does not distinguish § 924(c)).
230. See In re Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating that “[o]ur Court
hasn’t decided if Johnson applies to § 924(c)(3)(B) and ‘the law is unsettled’ as to
whether Johnson invalidates sentences that relied on the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause”)
(quoting In re Pinder, 824 F.3d 977, 978–79 (11th Cir. 2016)) (alteration in original).
231. United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 133–34 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that
the scope of the violated criminal statute may control whether an offender is deemed
a “career” offender); United States v. McCallister, No. 15-0171, 2016 WL 3072237, at
*4 (D.D.C. May 31, 2016) (denying the categorical approach because 924(c) does not
enhance penalties for prior convictions); United States v. Clarke, 171 F. Supp. 3d 449,
452–53 (D. Md. 2016) (applying a variation of the modified categorical approach);
United States v. McDaniels, 147 F. Supp. 3d 427, 435 (E.D. Va. 2015) (holding that,
even if the residual clause were held unconstitutionally vague, the defendant could
still be found guilty of a crime of violence because a Hobbs Act robbery is categorically
a crime of violence under the force clause); United States v. Wells, No. 2:14-cr-00280JCM-GWF, 2015 WL 10352877, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2015) (explaining that a broadlysweeping, generic crime law may not count as an ACCA predicate offense).
232. No. 2:14-cr-00280-JCM-GWF, 2015 WL 10352877, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2015).
233. Id.
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case with respect to § 924(c).234 Further, some district courts do not
apply the categorical approach because they fear it is a way in which
repeat offenders can evade sentencing enhancements and forces
judges into an “alternative reality.”235 Juries, however, may use real-world
facts to determine whether an offense constitutes a crime of violence
under § 924(c) because § 924(c)’s definition of crime of violence
involves an instant, rather than predicate, offense.236
Courts that do use the categorical approach in determining whether
an offense is a crime of violence under § 924(c) sometimes reach
inconsistent results with respect to similar crimes, such as robbery. For
example, in United States v. Bell,237 the district court, confronted with a
motion to dismiss a § 924(c) count, used the categorical approach to
determine whether the general robbery-of-government-property
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2112, constitutes a § 924(c) crime of violence.238
The court, relying on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Rodriguez,239 held that robbery under § 2112 can be committed in a
nonviolent way and that it thus sweeps too broadly to qualify
categorically as a crime of violence under the § 924(c) elements
clause.240 The court then considered the constitutionality of the § 924(c)
residual clause and, finding the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dimaya “highly
persuasive,” determined that the clause is void for vagueness under

234. See id. (citing United States v. Standberry, 139 F. Supp. 3d 734, 737 (E.D.
Va. 2015); United States v. McDaniels, 147 F. Supp. 3d 427, 432 (E.D. Va. 2015);
United States v. Church, No. 1:15-CR-42-TLS, 2015 WL 7738032 (N.D. Ind. Dec.
1, 2015)) (explaining that the utility of the categorical approach is questionable in the
context of an obviously violent charge).
235. See United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 138 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing a
scenario in which obviously violent crimes are not characterized as such because of the
application of the categorical approach).
236. See Holman, supra note 68, at 213 (illustrating that an offense may be carried
out violently without categorically being a crime of violence through the example that
tampering with a witness might not require a violent act, but a defendant might tamper
with a witness in a violent manner, such as by murdering the witness in order to prevent
that witness from testifying).
237. 158 F. Supp. 3d 906 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
238. Id. at 918–21.
239. 925 F.2d 1049 (7th Cir. 1991).
240. Bell, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 920–21 (citing Rodriguez, 925 F.2d at 1051) (describing
the non-violent scenario of grabbing a key chain attached to a belt loop with robbery
of government property under § 2112).
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Johnson.241 The court accordingly concluded that § 2112 robbery does
not qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c).242
By contrast, in United States v. McDaniels,243 another district court
addressed a motion to dismiss two § 924(c) counts, which claimed a
Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 does not qualify as a
§ 924(c) crime of violence.244 The court concluded that the categorical
approach does not apply to a pretrial motion to dismiss a § 924(c)
count on this ground.245 It ruled that the issue of whether the
commission of a specific Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of
violence under § 924(c) should be submitted to a jury that has received
proper instruction regarding the § 924(c)(3) definition of a crime of
violence.246 Nonetheless, the court also considered whether a Hobbs Act
robbery qualifies under the § 924(c) elements clause, and determined
that it does.247
In the relatively short time since Dimaya was decided, courts have
continued to employ different means of analyzing the constitutionality
of § 924(c)(3)(B). For example, in United States v. Eshetu, the District
of Colombia Circuit reversed its earlier decision and held that because
the categorical approach applies to the residual clause of § 924(c), it
necessarily is unconstitutional under Dimaya.248 Similarly, in United
States v. Rossetti249 the district court rejected the government’s
argument that the defendant’s actual conduct should be considered
under the § 924(c) residual clause and held the provision
unconstitutional under Dimaya.250 By contrast, in Khan v. United States,251
the district court agreed with the government’s argument that the fact
finder should consider the defendant’s actual conduct in determining
whether the defendant committed a crime of violence under §

241. Id. at 921–24.
242. Id. at 924–25.
243. 147 F. Supp. 3d 427 (E.D. Va. 2015).
244. Id. at 429.
245. Id. at 433.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 433–35 (finding that because the Hobbs Act follows the definition of
common law robbery, it is sufficiently analogous to the force clause of § 924(c)).
248. See United States v. Eshetu, No. 15-3020, 2018 WL 3673907, at *1 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 3, 2018) (explaining that the court is bound by circuit precedent that the
categorical approach must be used when determining whether an offense is a crime
of violence under § 924(c)(3)(B)).
249. No. CR 99-10098-RGS, 2018 WL 3748161 (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2018).
250. Id.
251. No. 1:03-CR-296-2 (LMB), 2018 WL 3651582 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2018).
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924(c)(3)(B).252 In fact, since Dimaya, the government has taken the
position that, to curtail constitutional issues, courts should cease using
the categorical approach to determine whether an offense is a crime
of violence under the § 924(c) residual clause and instead send the
facts to the jury.253
Courts are thus split on whether to apply the categorical approach
when determining if an offense is a crime of violence under § 924(c).
Because § 924(c) is so similar to statutes that require the use of the
categorical approach, such as the ACCA and § 16, some courts opt to
employ the categorical approach.254 However, because a § 924(c)
conviction depends on a defendant using or carrying a firearm in the
course of committing a crime of violence, other courts do not use the
categorical approach because § 924(c) is a separate crime based on
real-world facts that can be sent to a jury.255 The next section of this
Comment argues that courts should not employ the categorical
approach when determining whether an offense is a crime of violence
under the § 924(c) residual clause, and that by doing so courts will avoid
having the clause held unconstitutional under Dimaya.
II. COURTS SHOULD NOT APPLY THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH
TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN OFFENSE IS A CRIME
OF VIOLENCE UNDER THE § 924(C) RESIDUAL CLAUSE
Section 924(c) is distinguishable from both the ACCA and § 16 as
used in the immigration context. A court sentencing a defendant
under the ACCA must determine whether a defendant’s past criminal
convictions qualify as either serious drug offenses or, as relevant here,
violent felonies.256 Similarly, an immigration court must determine
whether a non-citizen’s prior conviction was for a crime of violence
under § 16.257 By contrast, § 924(c) applies not to past convictions, but
instead to real-world facts. A jury considering a case under § 924(c)
must determine whether the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable
252. See id (finding that the defendant’s actual conduct did not constitute a crime
of violence).
253. See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 303 n.1 (7th Cir. 2018)
(explaining that the government requested that the Supreme Court return vacate
certain judgments because Dimaya indicates that a court could avoid constitutional issues
by considering the defendant’s conduct instead of using the categorical approach).
254. See supra Section I.B.6.a.
255. See supra Section I.A.
256. See supra Introduction.
257. See supra Section I.B.
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doubt that the defendant used or carried a firearm during and in
relation to, or possessed a firearm in furtherance of, either a particular
drug trafficking crime or a particular crime of violence.258 Given the
distinctions between § 924(c), the ACCA, and § 16 and the role that a
jury already plays in determining whether a defendant charged with
§ 924(c) has committed a crime of violence, the constitutional
problems created by use of the categorical approach under the ACCA
can be eliminated by having the jury determine whether the offense at
hand qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause.
A. Distinctions Between § 924(c) and Statutes that
Require the Categorical Approach
Distinctions under Taylor
The Supreme Court in Taylor devised the categorical approach for
sentencing courts to determine whether a prior conviction is a violent
felony under the ACCA based on three factors: (1) the language of
the ACCA, (2) the ACCA’s legislative history, and (3) the practical
difficulties in using a factual approach.259 However, none of the three
factors that led the Court to adopt the categorical approach under the
ACCA apply in the case of § 924(c). Because both § 16 and § 924(e)
involve prior convictions, courts must use the categorical approach
when determining whether those prior convictions constitute crimes
of violence under Taylor.260 However, § 924(c) involves an instant
charge rather than a prior conviction.261 Therefore, courts should
avoid extending the categorical approach beyond its intended purpose
to statutes such as § 924(c).262
The Court’s first reason for using the categorical approach rather
than a fact-based approach in Taylor was the language of the ACCA
itself, which is irrelevant to the § 924(c) residual clause.263 The court
in Taylor observed that the ACCA applies to a defendant who has three
prior convictions for, rather than a person who may have committed,
1.

258. See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2013).
259. See supra Section I.B.1.
260. Id.
261. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH: A STEP-BY-STEP
ANALYSIS (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annualnational-training-seminar/2016/slideshow_categorical-approach.pdf (explaining that
only the elements of the offense can be used for the instant offense of conviction).
262. United States v. Standberry, 139 F. Supp. 3d 734, 736 (E.D. Va. 2015).
263. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–01 (1990).
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violent felonies or drug crimes.264 In contrast, § 924(c) does not deal
with prior convictions. The Court in Taylor noted that the elements
clause of the ACCA violent felony definition focuses on the statutory
elements rather than conduct.265 The Court further reasoned that, in
this context, the term “burglary” likely refers to the elements of the
offense rather than the underlying conduct of a particular
defendant.266 Section 924(c), by contrast, does not apply to prior
convictions, but instead is itself a crime.267 It applies to a person who
uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to, or possesses a
firearm in furtherance of, a “crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime.”268 Therefore, the language and purpose of the § 924(c)
residual clause is distinct from the ACCA residual clause, thus making
the categorical approach unnecessary under § 924(c).
The Court’s second reason for creating the categorical approach in
Taylor does not affect § 924(c) because it relied on the legislative
history of the ACCA.269 Looking to the ACCA’s legislative history, the
Court in Taylor concluded that Congress intended for courts to look to
the elements of the crimes rather than to the facts underlying
convictions made pursuant to ACCA.270 However, nothing in the
legislative history of § 924(c) indicates that Congress had a similar
intent.271 On the contrary, the legislative history of § 924(c) shows that
Congress wanted to combat the “dangerous combination of drugs and
guns,” and therefore was likely more concerned with the facts
underlying the convictions than the convictions themselves.272
The Court’s third reason for using the categorical approach in
Taylor, which was the threat of practical difficulties and potential
unfairness with using a fact-based approach to determine whether a
prior conviction was a violent felony, also does not apply to § 924(c).273
The Court questioned whether the government would be able to
produce a trial transcript from the underlying conviction or call
264. Id. at 600 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012)).
265. Id. (explaining that violent felonies are any crimes punishable for over oneyear imprisonment that have an element of threat or use of force).
266. Id. at 600–01.
267. Id. at 601.
268. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
269. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601.
270. Id.
271. See supra Section I.A (considering the legislative history of § 924(c)).
272. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998) (quoting Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993)).
273. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601–02.
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witnesses against the defendant using a fact-based approach, which
could be highly inefficient and prejudicial to the defendant.274
Therefore, one of the Supreme Court’s goals in Taylor was to avoid
mini-trials to determine the factual bases for prior convictions.275
However, the difficulties that would arise if a sentencing court had to
explore the facts underlying prior convictions are not implicated
under § 924(c). Unlike analyzing prior convictions retroactively in
sentencing hearings, § 924(c) involves an instant, rather than
predicate offense, which allows juries to “have the benefit of viewing
the evidence as it unfolds.”276 Therefore, § 924(c) would not raise the
mini-trial concerns of § 924(e) and § 16 if a jury decides whether the
offense at issue is a crime of violence based on the real-world facts that
already presented.277
2.

Crime of violence is an element of § 924(c), not a sentencing enhancement
Section 924(c) includes as an element the commission of a crime of
violence or a drug trafficking crime, making it inappropriate to apply
the categorical approach because the elements of a crime should be
submitted to a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt.278 This is
distinct from determining whether prior convictions are for violent
felonies under § 924(e) or crimes of violence under § 16 because those
determinations do not involve the elements of the offenses before the
court. Instead, those statutes involve a sentencing enhancement.279
Some crimes have the capacity to be committed in a violent manner,
and a properly instructed jury could decide whether the manner in
which a crime was committed renders it a crime of violence as an
element under § 924(c).280 For example, in United States v. Hernandez,281
the district court determined that conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act

274. Id.
275. Id. at 601.
276. United States v. Wells, No. 2:14-cr-00280-JCM-GWF, 2015 WL 10352877, at *3
(D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2015).
277. See United States v. Hernandez, 228 F. Supp. 3d 128, 132 (D. Me. 2017) (“[T]he
elaborate fact-finding process that Taylor was concerned about is not going to pose the
same problems in a contemporaneously charged § 924(c) offense.”).
278. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013) (explaining that any
facts which increase the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime are elements and
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt).
279. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 577.
280. See Wells, 2015 WL 10352877, at *3 (finding that the Hobbs Act robbery was a
crime of violence under both the categorical and modified categorical approaches).
281. 228 F. Supp. 3d 128 (D. Me. 2017).
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robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 does not qualify as a crime of violence
under the definition in the residual clause of the § 924(c) definition
of crime of violence because a “conspiracy” does not have as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another.282 Although the court in
Hernandez did not do this, a court could present the facts of a particular
Hobbs Act conspiracy to a jury to determine whether it “involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”283 The
district court in Hernandez only reluctantly employed the categorical
approach, noting in part that § 924(c) does not entail the mini-trial
concern that Taylor addresses.284
In short, because the concerns that brought about the categorical
approach for sentencing purposes are not present in a § 924(c) case—
“crime of violence” is an element of § 924(c)—it does not make sense
for courts to apply the categorical approach to § 924(c).285
B. Sending Facts to the Jury as Opposed to Applying the Categorical
Approach Addresses Constitutional Issues Under the § 924(c) Residual Clause
If courts sent facts to the jury to determine whether an offense is a
crime of violence under the § 924(c) residual clause, then possible
constitutional issues under the § 924(c) residual clause would be
avoided. Some defendants argue that the § 924(c) residual clause is
void for vagueness because of its similarity to the ACCA residual clause,
which was held unconstitutional in Johnson,286 and because it has
identical language to the § 16 residual clause, which the Supreme
Court voided for vagueness in Dimaya.287 However, because § 924(c)
functions differently from both the ACCA and § 16(b), courts could
sidestep the constitutional issue posed by § 924(c) by sending facts to
the jury rather than employing the categorical approach.
In Johnson’s majority opinion, the Court expressed that applying a
phrase like “substantial risk”—used in both § 16(b) and § 924(c)(3)—
to real-world conduct is generally not unconstitutionally vague.288 A
282. Id. at 138.
283. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (2012).
284. 228 F. Supp. 3d at 132.
285. Wells, 2015 WL 10352877, at *3 (citing United States v. McDaniels, 147 F. Supp.
3d 427, 432 (E.D. Va. 2015)).
286. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
287. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08 (2018).
288. 135 S. Ct. at 2561.
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year later, in Welch v. United States,289 the Court indicated that the
primary cause of the residual clause’s vagueness is the categorical
approach.290 The Court explained that the ACCA residual clause failed
“not because it adopted a ‘serious potential risk’ standard but because
applying that standard under the categorical approach required courts
to assess the hypothetical risk posed by an abstract generic version of
the offense.”291 The Court in Welch also clarified that the Court’s
analysis in Johnson does not automatically cast doubt on the multitude
of other laws that “‘require gauging the riskiness of conduct in which
an individual defendant engages on a particular occasion.’”292 And in
Dimaya, the Court made clear that applying the § 16(b) “substantial
risk” standard would be constitutional if applied to real-world facts.293
The decisions in Johnson, Welch, and Dimaya all demonstrate that the
categorical approach can present void for vagueness issues, but this
result can be avoided under § 924(c) because it applies to real-world
facts that can be sent to a jury. The opportunity to sidestep the potential
constitutional issue under the § 924(c) residual clause exists because
§ 924(c) is significantly different from the ACCA and § 16. Both
§ 924(e) and § 16 require a sentencing judge to determine whether a
defendant’s prior conviction was for a violent felony or a crime of
violence, but § 924(c) requires that a defendant use, carry, or possess
a firearm while committing a crime that must be proved to a jury in any
event.294 While the language of the § 924(c) residual clause is similar to that
of the ACCA and identical to that of § 16(b), it applies in a very different
context. Courts can avoid declaring the residual clause unconstitutionally
vague by permitting juries review real-world facts in relation to the clause,
as opposed to allowing judges to make a determination based on their
imagined version of the “ordinary case” of a crime.295
Having a jury decide whether a particular crime satisfies the § 924(c)
residual clause also remedies another potential constitutional problem
under Apprendi.296 According to the Court in Apprendi, a judge cannot

289. 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).
290. Id. at 1262.
291. Id.
292. Id. (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561).
293. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1215–16 (2018).
294. See Munoz v. Thomas, No. CV. 10-407-MO, 2010 WL 3470114, at *2 (D. Or.
Aug. 30, 2010) (acknowledging that a § 924(c) conviction is a current conviction,
which makes a habeas petitioner “ineligible for early release”).
295. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1215–16.
296. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490–92, 497 (2000).
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make findings about real-world facts that increase a defendant’s
sentence (except for the fact of a prior conviction), but a jury can.297
For example, in the case of a Hobbs Act conspiracy, a judge would
violate Apprendi if she were to make factual findings about the way the
crime was committed in determining whether it satisfies the § 924(c)
residual clause.298 However, having a jury perform this function would
avoid the Apprendi problem.
In sum, resting the decision of whether an offense is a crime of
violence under the § 924(c) residual clause on real-world facts (as
opposed to judge-imagined abstractions) would address the Johnson
void for vagueness concern, and relying on a jury make this decision
instead of a judge would address the Apprendi concern.
C. Policy Considerations
1.

Courts should construe § 924(c) in a way that avoids finding the statute
unconstitutional
Courts should avoid constitutional concerns when there are
alternative plausible interpretations of a provision.299 An alternative
plausible interpretation of § 924(c) is that the jury should determine
whether a defendant committed a crime of violence under the
§ 924(c) residual clause. It is true that in Dimaya the Court reasoned
that the § 16(b) text “demands a categorical approach,” in part based
on the inclusion of the term “by its nature,” given that “[a]n offense’s
‘nature’ means its ‘normal and characteristic quality.’”300 The § 924(c)
residual clause contains this language as well. However, the Supreme
Court has on other occasions interpreted statutes in such a way as to
avoid holding them unconstitutional. For example, in United States v.
Booker,301 the Court held that the mandatory federal sentencing
guidelines were unconstitutional under Apprendi because they authorized
a sentencing judge to find facts that increased a defendant’s maximum
sentence.302 However, rather than holding the guidelines unconstitutional,
297. Id. at 481–83, 490–92.
298. Id.
299. See Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014) (finding that alternative
plausible interpretations of a provision do not matter in the absence of ambiguity).
300. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1217–18 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1507 (2002)).
301. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
302. See id. at 245–46 (favoring excision of provisions making the guidelines
mandatory over “engraft[ing] onto the existing system . . . [the] Sixth Amendment ‘jury
trial’ requirement”).
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the Court excised the statutory language making the guidelines mandatory,
thereby rendering them advisory.303
In the wake of Dimaya, applying the categorical approach to the
§ 924(c) residual clause would render the statute void for vagueness.
Having a judge determine whether an offense was a crime of violence
under the residual clause would also violate Apprendi. Both results can
be avoided by having the issue resolved by the jury based on the actual
facts of the proposed crime of violence.
2.

Applying the categorical approach to § 924(c) is a threat to uniformity
The categorical approach is also a threat to uniformity, making it
dangerous for courts to apply the categorical approach to § 924(c).304
Although the Supreme Court crafted the categorical approach to avoid
inconsistency among courts, inconsistency is exactly what it produced.305
Since the Court in Taylor created the categorical approach over twenty
years ago, courts have struggled to understand its complexities.306
The Ninth Circuit has even asserted that the categorical approach
might be the area of the law that is most demanding of the circuit’s

303. See, e.g., id. at 222 (finding that Federal Sentencing Guidelines must be
considered during sentencing but can be tailored in light of statutory concerns).
304. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2267–68 (2016) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that while Congress enacted the ACCA to ensure that repeat
offenders committing offenses such as “burglary” are subject to an increase in their
maximum punishment for crimes of violence in a consistent manner, burglary is often
dismissed as a crime of violence under the categorical approach).
305. See United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir.
2011) (per curiam) (explaining that the court has utilized many resources in order to
better understand the categorical approach and avoid further inconsistencies by
citing: United States v. Strickland, 601 F.3d 963, 967–71 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc)); Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 912–13 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
banc); United States v. Snellenberger, 548 F.3d 699, 700–02 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(per curiam); Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc); United States v. Vidal, 504 F.3d 1072, 1086–90 (9th Cir. 2007) (en
banc); Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 847–48, 851–52 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Fernandez-Ruiz v.
Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1132–35 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States v. CoronaSanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1211–13 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).
306. See Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 917 (citing Strickland, 601 F.3d at 967–
71; Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 912–13; Snellenberger, 548 F.3d at 700–01; EstradaEspinoza, 546 F.3d at 1159–60; Vidal, 504 F.3d at 1086–90; Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at
1073; Grisel, 488 F.3d at 847–48, 851–52; Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1132–35; CoronaSanchez, 291 F.3d at 1211–13).
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resources.307 For example, in the case United States v. Strickland,308 the
Ninth Circuit struggled to determine if the modified categorical
approach must be used when a non-categorical state statute is broader
than the federal definition of a predicate offense.309 Similarly, in the
case Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey,310 the Ninth Circuit tackled the issue
of whether a twenty-year-old man’s sexual relationship with a sixteenyear-old girl categorically qualifies as “sexual abuse of a minor” under
the modified categorical approach, although it does not categorically
constitute a “sexual abuse of a minor” under the categorical
approach.311 If the categorical approach were an easier tool for courts
to use, courts of appeals such as the Ninth Circuit would not see as
many cases like Strickland and Estrada-Espinoza.312 Since § 924(c) does
not require the categorical approach because it applies to real-world
facts, courts would save both time and resources by allowing juries to
determine whether the defendant committed a crime of violence.
When courts employ the categorical approach to § 924(c), they are
risking inconsistent results. The case United States v. Chapman313
illustrates the inconsistency that the categorical approach fosters by
providing an example of two defendants who committed identical
crimes, but in different states.314 Although the two defendants had
fundamentally the same criminal history, the applicability of the ACCA
to their convictions depended on the language of their states’ criminal
statutes, leading to inconsistent sentences.315 Similarly, the court in Bell
held that a § 2112 robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence for
§ 924(c) purposes,316 while the court in McDaniels held that a Hobbs

307. See Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 917 (citing Strickland, 601 F.3d at 967–
71); Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 912–13; Snellenberger, 548 F.3d at 700–01; EstradaEspinoza, 546 F.3d at 1159–60; Vidal, 504 F.3d at 1086–90; Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at
1073; Grisel, 488 F.3d at 847–48, 851–52; Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1132–35; CoronaSanchez, 291 F.3d at 1211–13) (showing that the court has utilized multiple applications
of the categorical approach for years without avail as to its proper application).
308. 601 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2010).
309. Id. at 967.
310. 546 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2008).
311. Id. at 1150, 1159.
312. Strickland, 601 F.3d at 967; Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1159.
313. 866 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2017).
314. See id. at 136–37 (Jordan, J., concurring) (emphasizing that a slight difference in
state criminal statutes could lead to identical defendants being treated very differently
under the ACCA, and arguing that Congress could not have intended this arbitrariness).
315. Id.
316. United States v. Bell, 158 F. Supp. 3d 906, 924–25 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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Act robbery does qualify.317 Thus, two defendants could engage in
virtually identical conduct—for example, they could both point a gun
at their victims and threaten to shoot the victims if they did not hand
over money—yet if one were charged under § 2112 and the other
charged under the Hobbs Act robbery, only the latter could also be
charged with a § 924(c) offense.
Therefore, when courts apply the categorical approach to § 924(c),
there is a substantial chance that a defendant in one state will receive
a completely different sentence than a defendant who committed an
identical crime in another state. Courts can remedy this inconsistency
when determining whether an offense is a crime of violence under
§ 924(c) by sending facts to a jury to decide as opposed to utilizing the
categorical approach.
3.

Recommended jury instructions
According to the law set forth in the discussion above, in a trial
where the jury must determine whether an offense is a crime of
violence under the § 924(c) residual clause, proper jury instructions
would include reading to the jury the § 924(c) definition of a crime of
violence318 as well as the definition and elements of the federal crime
of violence involved.319 This is proper because it is common and
constitutional for juries to consider such factors.320
The judge might also elaborate on the definition of a crime of
violence depending on the attorneys’ proposals. For example, a court
might instruct the jury to consider factors such as the risk that an

317. United States v. McDaniels, 147 F. Supp. 3d 427, 435 (E.D. Va. 2015).
318. See supra Section I.A (providing the § 924(c) definition of a crime of violence).
319. An example of a possible federal crime of violence involved that is often seen
in § 924(c) cases is the Hobbs Act robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012) (“Whoever in
any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any
article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires
so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in
furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.”).
320. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271–73 (1976) (explaining that juries must be
allowed to consider aggravating and mitigating factors when determining whether the
death penalty should be imposed, including factors such as the likelihood that the
defendant would be a “continuing threat to society,” severity of prior criminal conduct,
age of the defendant, whether the defendant was acting under duress, the defendant’s
mental or emotional state, and insanity).
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innocent party might appear during the commission of the offense;321
whether the defendant’s conduct was “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive”;322 and whether the defendant was indifferent to the
possibility of violent collateral consequences of her offense.323 In the
case of a conspiracy to commit a crime with the element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against a person or
property of another, the jury could consider the likelihood that the
crime would have been carried out.324
CONCLUSION
Courts should not employ the categorical approach when
determining whether an offense is a crime of violence under the
residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Section 924(c) is distinguishable
from statutes that require the categorical approach when determining
whether an offense underlying a prior conviction is a crime of violence.
Statutes that require the categorical approach—such as the ACCA and
§ 16—do so because a crime of violence applies to predicate offenses,
which enhance the sentence and not just an element of the statute. In
those statutes, if a defendant has committed a certain number of
crimes of violence in the past, then a sentencing judge might increase
the minimum and maximum possible sentence. However, whether an
offense is a crime of violence is an element of § 924(c), not a
sentencing enhancement. Section 924(c) also deals with a current
charge rather than a prior conviction, and would thus avoid the
inefficiency of mini-trials when using a fact-based approach to
determine whether an offense constitutes a crime of violence.
Therefore, courts should not employ the categorical approach when
determining whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 924(c).

321. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007), overruled by Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (suggesting that the main risk of burglary arises from “the
possibility that an innocent person might confront the burglar during the crime”).
322. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008), abrogated by Johnson, 135 S.
Ct. 2551 (concluding that driving under the influence falls outside the scope of a crime
of violence because it is not a “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” crime).
323. See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2011), overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct.
2551 (holding that vehicular flight constitutes a crime of violence because when a
perpetrator flees in a police car, she creates a situation that is dangerous to others).
324. United States v. Turner, 501 F.3d 59, 67 (1st Cir. 2007).
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Instead, courts should send facts to the jury to decide whether a certain
offense is a crime of violence.325
Sending facts to the jury as opposed to applying the categorical
approach also fixes the possible void for vagueness issue under the
§ 924(c) residual clause. The Court in Johnson deemed the ACCA
residual clause, which is similar to the § 924(c) residual clause,
unconstitutional.326 The Court in Dimaya also deemed the § 16
residual clause, which is identical to the § 924(c) residual clause,
unconstitutional.327 Although § 924(c) is similar to § 924(e) and identical
to § 16, sending facts to the jury as opposed to employing the
categorical approach would fix the constitutional issues under
§ 924(c). The constitutional issues under the ACCA and § 16 arise
because they deal with predicate, rather than current, offenses.
Because § 924(c) is a stand-alone crime that applies to real-world facts,
juries can assess those facts to determine whether the particular
offense constitutes a crime of violence. Courts should construe statutes
in a way that makes them constitutional, so sending the underlying
facts to the jury to determine whether the offense is a crime of violence
would relieve § 924(c) of the constitutional issues that § 924(e) and
§ 16 face under both Johnson and Apprendi.328
Because the categorical approach concerns instant offenses, rather
than predicate offenses, it raises unconstitutional issues when applied
under § 924(c). To avoid the issues presented by the categorical
approach, courts should instead send facts to the jury to determine
whether an offense is a crime of violence under § 924(c).

325. See supra Section II.A (contending that § 924(c) is distinct from statutes that
require the categorical approach, thus making the categorical approach unnecessary
under § 924(c)).
326. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562–63.
327. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1207–08 (2018).
328. See supra Section II.B (reasoning that sending facts to the jury avoids
constitutional issues under § 924(c)).

